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THE INQUISITORIAL FUNCTIONS OF
GRAND JURIES
GEORGE H. DESSIONO AND ISADORE H. COHENt
WHILE denying the traditional virtues of grand juries and dis-
crediting them as wielders of the power of indictment, current
criticism nevertheless remains non-committal as to their value
for John Doe investigation into crime. As epitomized by the
report of the National Commission for Law Observance and
Enforcement, there seems to be some feeling that they are still
of possible use in that quarter: "Today the grand jury is useful
only as a general investigating body for inquiring into the con-
duct of public officers and in case of large conspiracies. It should
be retained as an occasional instrument for such purposes... j"
In the same vein, legislation in the information states, mirrored
in the American Law Institute's Draft Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, retains the possibility of impanelling occasional grand
juries for purposes of investigation.2
But with attention concentrated on the disadvantages of ac-
cusation by indictment, the implications of provision for merely
occasional grand juries have perhaps not been entirely foreseen.
For these two problems-accusation and investigation-are
scarcely separable, either in practice or policy. Grand jury in-
quiry has by no means been confined to city-wide inquiries into
"the conduct of public officers," nor again to dealing with "large
conspiracies." Criminal investigation has also its everyday side.
Not infrequently witnesses must be subpoenaed, i.e., there must
be an investigation, before it is possible to determine on a charge
against some particular person, whether complaint before a
magistrate or information by the prosecutor be the step con-
templated. The extent of past reliance on grand juries in this
regard is well brought out in a minority opinion by Judge Chase
of the New York Court of Appeals:
"In many counties of the state grand juries meet at very
infrequent intervals, and when evidence that a crime has been
* Instructor in the Yale School of Law; Managing Editor of the Y,= Liw
JOURNAL, 1929-30.
1 Member of the third year class in the Yale School of Law.
3-REPORT ON PROSECUTION op THE NATIONAL CODUSSION ron LAw OB-
sERVAc AND ENFORCEmENT (1931) 37.
2 CODE OF CRImNAL PROCEDURE, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1 (Am. L. InsL
1928) c. 4. § 119, provides that a grand jury shall be summoned at least
once a year in each county.
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committed is clear, but the person committing the crime cannot
be ascertained without taking the depositions of witnesses, the
delay in waiting for a grand jury to meet may result in a failure
of justice. It should not necessarily be fatal to an information
[laid before a magistrate] if it does not name or designate the
person who committed the crime." 2
Failing the automatic impanelling of grand juries at frequent
regular intervals, the suggested need for relaxing the require-
ments of complaints before magistrates becomes practically im-
perative, unless the alternative of entrusting subpoena power to
the prosecutor be adopted.4 But this means empowering magis-
trates and prosecutors to conduct general investigations and even
"fishing expeditions," a possibility conventionally held danger-
ous in the extreme.5 If the institution of such inquisitorial "one
man grand juries" is inevitably to accompany a system of ac-
cusation by information, argument for the latter should support
also the former.
These two problems, moreover, unfortunately dealt with as
separable, present important issues of policy in common. It is
urged that grand jury participation in the process of accusation
amounts to a mere rubber-stamping by bystanding jurors, serv-
ing but to dissipate responsibility preferably shouldered entire
by the prosecutor., How shall one then picture the r8le of these
same jurors in a general investigation? Has the latter process
some tendency to stir independent initiative on the part of the
jurors, whilst curbing it on the part of the prosecutor? It will
3 People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N. Y. 383, 395, 79 N. E. 330,
335 (1906).
4It is, of course, still legally possible to impanel a grand jury whenever
needed in an information state. In Missouri they were continued in almost
constant session in the large cities, being used as "deposition mills" by the
prosecution, and also for investigating purposes. Extracts from Corn..
spondence with Arthur V. Lashly (1927) 5 THE: PANEL 3; Cockrell, Manda-
tory Grand Juries in Missouri (1931) 9 THE PANEL 47. They are also still
extensively used in Indiana and Iowa. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury
System (1931) 10 ORE. L. REv. 295, 342.
More generally, however, they have fallen into disuse. This has been
the experience of Connecticut, Michigan, Nebraska, Washington and Wis-
consin. Ibid. 223 n. 116; Nahum and Schatz, The Grand Jury In Connecti-
cut (1931) 5 CONN. BAI. J. 111, 124.
A recent Michigan law has provided for the regular impanelling of grand
juries to sit for six months terms. Pub. Acts 1931, No. 284. See Toy, Mich-
igan'7s New Law for Sioc Months Grand Juries (1932) 10 THE PANEL 3.
5 Consult People ex, rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, supra note 3, at 391, 79
N. E. at 333.
6 Miller, Informations or Indictments in Criminal Cases (1924) 8 MINN.
L. Ray. 379; Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment
or Information (1931) 29 MICH. L. R.v. 403; Morse, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 362; REPORT cit. supra note 1, at 36, 124.
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be recalled that the relations between prosecutor and jury in each
of these processes are assuredly of a legal identity.7 If the in-
terests of justice will be better served by stripping away the
prosecutor's grand jury mask-or, from another point of view,
his grand jury check-in the one case, why not then in the
other? Proposals such as that quoted from the Wickersham
Report, with the issue raised by inquisitorial magistrates and
prosecutors, suggest an examination of the place occupied by
grand juries in our inquisitorial scheme. The various types of
agencies entrusted with inquisitorial power will first be reviewed,
after which the conditions and limitations on its exercise by each
may be considered.
I
The proceedings to be reviewed are of considerable variety,
ranging from those concerned with but a single occurrence, like
an unsolved murder, to those comprehending a whole widespread
system of graft and corruption. An investigation may be cx
parte or otherwise, with hearings conducted secretly or in public.
The prime purpose may be prosecution of particular culprits, or
exposure of a general condition. But all are characterized by
the exercise of a power termed inquisitorial. What are the
requisites of this power, and the conditions of its effectiveness,
by which grand juries and other investigating bodies may be
contrasted and evaluated?
Agencies Empowered to Inquire Generally Into Crime
"The proceedings before a grand jury constitute the only gen-
eral criminal investigation known to the law." So argued the
New York court, holding invalid an investigation which the at-
torney general attempted to conduct into the suspected murder
of one Clarence Peters., The sense in which this familiar state-
ment must be taken and the requisites of inquisitorial power
may best be understood by setting up the limitations tradition-
ally imposed on inquiry by magistrates and prosecutors as a
background. A prosecutor may indeed inquire generally, but,
in the majority of our jurisdictions, without subpoena power.
The ask-to-see summons, while persuasive, is by no means the
same thing. Magistrates, on the other hand, while empowered
to issue subpoenas, are bound in their investigations by the
confines of a specific charge.
The nature of this charge will bear scrutiny at this point,
7 Consult Part II, infra, for a discussion of these relations.
8 Ward Baking Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 205 App. Div. 723, 728, 200
N. Y. Supp. 865, 869 (3d Dep't 1923).
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however, for the slightest relaxation in its requirements amounts
to authorization for a "one man grand jury," i.e., a magistrate
with general inquisitorial powers. A typical provision govern-
ing the requirements of the complaint or information which
serves to confer jurisdiction on a magistrate, is Section 148 of
the New York Code of Criminal Procedure:
"When an information is laid before a magistrate, of the com-
mission of a crime, he must examine on oath the informant or
prosecutor, and any witnesses he may produce, and take their
depositions in writing, and cause them to be subscribed by the
parties making them." 9
Under these and similar provisions in the majority of states,"
the questions upon which the possibility of conducting a general
investigation before a magistrate must depend are, first, may
the information be purely upon information and belief; and
second, may it fail to specify any particular offender?
Were the answer to either question in the affirmative, it would
be possible to conduct a "fishing expedition" or John Doe investi-
gation. But the New York Court has held insufficient a com-
plaint which does not state the sources of information and
grounds of belief in a fashion to "fairly warrant the inference
by the magistrate that in good faith and on reasonable grounds
the complainant believes that a definite crime has been com-
mitted by a designated person." 'I Such statutes are similarly
construed in other jurisdictions. 12 The complaint is required to
designate some person "named or described." From time to
time a magistrate has taken it upon himself to conduct an in-
vestigation upon a complaint against "John Doe", no particular
person being referred to, but where the proceeding has been
contested the appellate courts have always held it to be without
jurisdiction.13
9 GILBERT'S CRIMIINAL CODE AND PENAL LAW (1930) 101.
20 Constitutional and statutory provisions are summarized in the Com-
mentaries on CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Am. L. Inst. 1928) c. 1, § 1.
11 People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, supra, note 3.
12 Note (1908) 9 Ann. Cas. 977.
13 People ex rel. Sampson v. Dunning, 113 App. Div. 35, 98 N. Y. Supp.
1067 (2d Dep't 1906); Matter of Both, 200 App. Div. 423, 192 N. Y. Supp.
822 (2d Dep't 1922); People ex rel. Travis v. Knott, 204 App. Div. 379,
198 N. Y. Supp. 142 (1st Dep't 1923); see Medalie, Grand Jury Inveslga-
tions (1929) 7 THE PANEL 5.
It has been said that any judge of a court of record in New York may
now conduct the inquiry commonly known as a John Doe proceeding, for
the purpose of ascertaining whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant
submission of the matter to a grand jury. Tuttle, The Grand Jury System
(1927) 5 THE PANEL 2, 3. The proceedings contemplated may be the type
of John Doe complaint before a magistrate, wherein a particular person
of name unknown is intended to be designated, and is described as accu-
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By the foregoing limitations the essentials of inquisitorial
power are suggested. Preceding the stage where specific ac-
cusations are desired or supportable, investigation must be free
from any restraint comparable to the specific charge and showing
of probable cause, required to confer jurisdiction and restricting
the scope of inquhy before a magistrate. Since the objective-
to establish the occurrence of a suspected criminal transaction,
or the implication therein of a particular suspect-is apt to
depend on the compelling of testimony and production of evi-
dence by unwilling witnesses, there must be the power, lacking
in the types of inquiry conducted by detectives or in the prose-
cutor's office, to issue subpoenas and to punish for contempt.
The very requisites of this power render it peculiarly suscep-
tible of abuse. "Fishing expeditions" may be launched, without
probable cause to justify the attendant casting of suspicions and
besmirching of reputations. Where persons ultimately to be
prosecuted are knowm from the outset, a proceeding as yet
formally aimed at no one may permit their being subpoenaed
as witnesses, thereby evading-or avoiding-any privilege of
"parties" against being called at all. An inquiry ostensibly into
crime may cloak the securing of evidence for private litigation.
Orders to produce documentary evidence in quantity may work
unnecessary inconvenience, in the matters of time and expense.
But the power must nevertheless be lodged somewhere. For
purposes of investigating into crime generally, the traditional
solution has been to entrust it to grand juries, while denying
it to other agencies in the criminal process. Hence the concep-
tion of grand juries as the only general inquisitorial bodies
known to our law, and identification of the power with proceed-
ings before them.
In a number of states, however, this traditionally grand jury
power has now been definitely lodged elsewhere. Objections on
constitutional grounds-for the most part along separation-of-
powers lines-have been unavailing.1 4  Connecticut offers the
oldest example, power to conduct a John Doe inquisition into
rately as possible. Or it might be argued that. from the power of a judge
of a court of record to impanel a grand jury when, in his discretion, the
public interest may so require, a power to subpoena witnesses in aid of
his discretion may be implied. But the few cases on this point-both in
other states-are squarely against the inference. Williams v. People, 103
Colo. 1909, 103 Pac. 298 (1909) ; Ketcham v. Comm., 204 Ky. 168, 263 S. W.
725 (1924).
14 State v. Daniels, 38 S. D. 81, 160 N. W. 723 (1916) ; Matter of Clark,
65 Conn. 17, 31 Atl. 522 (1894); McCarthy v. Clancy, 110 Conn. 482, 148
Atl. 551 (1931); see People v. Doe, 226 Mich. 5, 196 N. W. 77 (1921)
(divided court; four judges held the statute valid, and four avoided pass-
ing on the issue); Marsh, MicIdgan's One Man Grand Ju:ry (1924) 8 J.
Am. JuD. Soc. 121.
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crime being lodged originally in bodies of three grand jurors, and
more recently, also in bodies of three justices of the peaceO1 In
Michigan and a few other states more recent authorization by
statute is found for similar inquiries by single magistrates or
judges, referred to as the "one man grand juries." "0 In Xansas,
Montana and Utah, statutes authorize similar inquiries by
prosecuting attornies into gambling or liquor offenses."'
The powers of United States Commissioners to subpoena wit-
nesses in proceedings following the filing of a complaint are im-
plied from the provision that they inay arrest, imprison, dr bail
an offender "agreeably to the usual mode of process against
offenders in such state." 18 In a state where the magistrates may
not conduct general investigations the United States Commis-
sioner would consequently be similarly unauthorized."' But in
the few states where magistrates have been empowered to act
as "one man grand juries," it may well be that the United States
Commissioners are similarly authorized 20
Agencies for Special Types of Investigation
In 1926 the New York Court of Appeals, in the course of up-
holding a statute authorizing the attorney'general to investigate
and to subpoena and examine witnesses with a view to discov-
ering violations of the local Blue Sky law, took occasion to point
out that the investing of officials and bodies other than grand
juries with inquisitorial power was by no means unusual; that
"the power here attacked is akin to that right of the legislature
to investigate and subpoena and examine witnesses to the end of
safeguarding public interests by appropriate legislation and
which is so well established as to have passed beyond the realm
of controversy." 21 As examples of analogous statutes confer-
ring power to investigate on administrative boards and officials,
15 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 366.
113MICH. ComP. LAws (1929) § 17217; S. D. CoMP. LAws (1929) § 4504;
VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) § 6617, as amended by Pub. Acts 1921, No. 207.
17 KAlN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 62, § 301 (gambling, liquor or any
offense where the accused is a fugitive from justice); MONT. REV. CODES
(Choate, 1921) § 11109 (liquor); UTAlH Comp. LAvs (1917) § 3374 (liquor).
Statutes conferring power on the attorneys general to inquiro Into
offenses against anti-trust, blue sky and election laws are also familiar.
For example: N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (1921) § 352; N. Y. Exuc. LAW (1922)
§ 66-A; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 50, § 153.
is Ray. STAT. § 1014 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 591 (1926).
10 See Matter of Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 F. (2d) 833 (N. D. Calif.
1930). The court held that the United States Commissioner in California
was unauthorized to subpoena witnesses and compel the production of evi-
dence to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant,
20 See ibid. 835.
21Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N. Y. 423, 434, 154 N. E. 298. 301 (1926).
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the Court pointed to those concerning the Superintendent of
Banks, the Commissioner of Agriculture and the Commissioner
of Accounts of the City of New York. New York is, moreover,
still a state where grand juries are continually and extensively
employed.
Without attempting to enumerate every statutory investment
of a body other than a grand jury with inquisitorial power which
may be turned to the exposure of crime-in New York State
alone they number well over twenty-a review of a number of
instances will serve to illustrate the manner in which some of
these supplement the grand juries? The burden of investigation
into the criminal activities of vice squad stool pigeons in New
York was recently borne not by a grand jury, but by the Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court. Inquiry into the "Queens
sewer scandal" a few years ago was conducted first by Judge
Scudder, and then by Judge Shearn, each acting as a Moreland
Act Commissioner, by direction of the governor, assisted by emi-
nent counsel and a corps of legal and technical assistants and
investigators. This inquiry resulted in the conviction of the
former borough president. Under the Public Officers Law in
New York the head of a state department, armed with the power
of subpoena, may make full investigation as to the official con-
duct of any subordinate. The Public Service Commission and
Transit Commission are given powers of wide scope for investi-
gating into matters relating to public utilities. Most important
of all, are the investigatory powers of the legislatures23 They
may compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
books, papers and records, before a legislative committee of in-
quiry, as in the Lexow, Hughes or Armstrong, and Hofstadter
investigations. The investigation of the Police Department during
the Gaynor administration in New York, by the Board of Alder-
men exercising a broad power under the city charter, may also be
recalled.
22 For a collection of the New York statutes, consult Handler, The Con-
stitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission: II (1928)
28 COL. L. REv. 905,928 n. 106. For a collection of federal statutes conferring
inquisitional power on officials, boards, commissions, etc., consult ibid. 925
et seq.
The great variety of investigating agencies brought to bear on the situa-
tion known as the "milk graft scandal" in New York a few years ago may
be recalled. Investigations were carried on by the Health Commissioner,
the Grand Jury, Judge Kelby, and Judge Tompkins sitting as a committing
magistrate in a John Doe proceeding, which was severely criticized by
the district attorney. Consult the New York Times Index for the period
from Jan. 1926-Dec. 1927.
23See Landis, Congressional Invetigationd (1926) 40 HARv. L. REv. 153.
As for the frequently exercised Congressional power of investigation, the
all-embracing character of "legislative purpose" discourages any attempt
to set limits to its scope.
1932]
HeinOnline  -- 41 Yale L. J. 693 1931-1932
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Doctrine, of course, distinguishes between investigations
"criminal in character" and those "non-criminal in character,"
all of those discussed in the present section falling within the
latter group. It is a distinction, however, which rests on no nec-
essary difference in the subject matter of inquiry, nor again on
the uses to which the evidence so extracted may eventually be
put. Although any one of these investigating bodies may be
forced to meet a jurisdictional attack by exhibiting the appro-
priate purpose other than criminal prosecution, within their re-
spective scopes-and it is difficult to imagine any act of official
misconduct, or even of private misconduct where it has a bear-
ing on official, which does not fall within at least one of these--
they quite naturally serve to uncover considerable crime, and
lead not infrequently to the lodging of criminal accusations. The
practice of turning over evidence obtained in one of these in-
vestigations to the prosecuting attorney or grand jury, and such
dual appointments as that of Max Steuer to act simultaneously
as a Moreland Act commidsioner (non-criminal in theory) and a
Special Assistant Attorney General, in the investigation of the
Bank of United States closing, are examples in point.
The function of investigating crime thus comes to be dis-
tributed amongst a number of variously adapted inquisitorial
bodies-the distribution depending, of course, on the range of
those available in the particular locality. Grand juries and
"one man grand juries" are distinguished from the rest by their
general availability or non-specialized character, since they are
the only agencies empowered to inquiry generally, armed with
subpoena power, into criminal transactions of every type.
II
Restraints on the Initiation of Investigation
The possibilities of abuse inherent in general inquisitorial power
have naturally suggested the desirability of curbing its arbitrary
exercise. The situation with reference to grand juries as under-
stood in the early days of this country, however, was set forth
as follows by James Wilson, one of the first justices to sit on
the Supreme Court:
"It has been alleged, that grand juries are confined, in their
inquiries, to the bills offered to them, to the crimes given them
in charge, and to the evidence brought before them by the prose-
cutor. But these conceptions are much too contracted; they
present but a very imperfect and unsatisfactory view of the
duty required from grand jurors, and of the trust reposed in
them.
[Vol. 41
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"The oath of a grand juryman-and his oath is the commis-
sion, under which he acts-assigns no limits, except those
marked by diligence itself, to the course of his inquiries; why,
then, should it be circumscribed by more contracted boundaries?
Shall diligent inquiry be enjoined? And shall the means and
opportunities of inquiries be prohibited or restrained?"'24
In Pennsylvania, however, restriction was favored.? In that
state, to this day, a grand jury may not proceed to investigate
in the absence of a charge by the court concerning the particular
matter in question.? Should the jury desire to inquire into some
matter not previously placed in their charge, they must present
the need to the court, as of their own knowledge. 2 7 But whether
or not the knowledge of but a few of the jurors suffices is not
made clear.28 In any case, after a proper presentment, the court
may transform the grand jury into an inquisitorial body by a
"charge" specifying the condition to be exposed, or denoting the
nature of the offenses to be investigated. Subpoenas may then
issue, and investigation proceed.
24 2 WILSON'S WORKS (Andrews' ed. 1896) 213-214. For further informa-
tion on the early practice, consult U. S. v. Thompkins, Fed. Cas. 16, 483
(C.C.D.C. 1812).
25 Matter of the Communication of the Grand Jury (Floyd & Carpenter's
Case) 5 PA. L. J. 55, 3 Clark 188 (Quarter Sessions Phila. 1845); REPORT
OF THE CRAMS SURVEY CommITTEE, LAW AssociATioN OF PHILADELPHIA
(1926) 96; 1 WHARTON, CRImiNAL LAw (5th ed. 1861) §§ 458, 459; Bell,
The Several Modes of InstitUting Criminal Proccedings in Pennsylvania,
13 PA. DIST. REP. 815, 827 (1904); see McCullough v. Comm., 67 Pa. 30, 33
(1870) ; Comm. ex rel. Jack v. Crans, 2 Pa. L. J. Rep. 172, 181 (1844).26 M]atter of Alleged Extortion Cases, 29 Pa. Co. Ct. 538 (1904); Comm.
v. Klein, 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 352 (1909); see Comm. v. Zortman, 33 Pa. Co.
Ct. 219, 223 (1906); Comm. ex rel. Phillips v. Norris, 15 LUZENE Lza.
REG. 409, 413 (1911).
For illustrations of the procedural steps and of the charges, consult
Comm. v. Kenehan, 12 Dist. & Co. Rep. 585, 30 Lacka, Jur. 58 (1929) ; Mat-
ter of Grand Jury, 65 PrrTSBURa LEG. J. 521 (1917) ; Charge to the Grand
Jury, 5 Dist. Rep. 130 (1895); authorities cited in note 25 supra.
It is said that such charges may be given only as to "matters affecting the
community generally"--a further limitation of indefinite scope. The whole
Pennsylvania procedure is one of exception added to exception to the gen-
eral rule denying the grand jury any independent power of investigation.
It is hoped to consider the eases in greater detail in a forthcoming article
on The Grand Jury in Pennsylvania.
27At this stage the jury may not subpoena witnesses. Comm. v. Green,
126 Pa. 531, 17 AtL. 878 (1889); see Comm. v. Dietrich, 7 Pa. Super. Ct.
515, 520 (1898).
This "presentment" is carefully defined, as the notice taken by a grand
jury of an offense from its own knowledge and observation. See Bell, supra,
note 25, at 826; Grand Jury v. Public Press, 4 Brewster 313, 317 (Pa. 1869);
Comm. v. Green, 126 Pa. 531, 537, 17 At. 878, 879 (1899).
28 It has b~en said that at least twelve members should each have personal
knowledge of the crime in question. Matter of Butler Grand Jury, 28 Pa.
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The question of restrictions was extensively considered by
the New York Code Commissioners in 1849. While advocating
a tremendous limitation on the indicting powers of the juries,
they were not, however, persuaded to erect the restrictions on
investigation found in Pennsylvania.29  And in this code there
accordingly appears no preliminary requirement of a charge.
This attitude has prevailed generally throughout the United
States.30
An inquisitorial magistrate or prosecutor is likewise free
from restraint in the initiation of an investigation, with the
additional advantage of not having to wait, as in the rural coun-
ties, for the impanelling of a grand jury. As for the non-criminal
agencies, they are more difficult to set in motion. A legislative
committee must be voted, a Moreland Act Commissioner ap-
pointed. But some are free, like the Commissioner of Accounts
or the head of a state department in New York, to initiate in-
quiry of their own motion.
Resources and Equipment
Granted the inquisitorial power and freedom to proceed, various
practical considerations begin to arise. From the outset investi-
gation depends on clues which may be followed up. Where and
how are these to be obtained? Expert assistance is apt to be
needed, sometimes a large organization of assistant counsel, ac-
countants and trained investigators. Ample funds and the pos-
sibility of spending considerable time may be required.
How are grand juries situated in these regards? They may
not, in the absence of most unusual statutory provision, retain
their own counsel, accountants or detectives." Their budgets
cover no more than the picayune fees of jurors and witnesses.
The jurors themselves are laymen, presumably unskilled in
investigation, and devoting but a small part of their time to the
task at hand. Superficially, they would appear quite devoid of
resources, forced to fall back on their own knowledge and such
complaints as might voluntarily reach their ears.
Such was indeed the position of the primitive grand inquest
in the days antedating the institution of public prosecutors and
even of the subpoena power. For the rural communities of
early England it was an arrangement probably by no means
Co. Ct. 83, 87 (1903); of. Charge to Grand Jury, 5 Pa. Dist. lep. 130
(1895).2 9 FOURTH REPORT OF THE NEW YORK COM DISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND
PLEADINGS (Code of Criminal Procedure) (1849) xxxvii.
30 A detailed study of the authorities on this point will be presented in
a forthcoming article on The Development of Grand Juries.
1 (1922) 7 MINN. L. REV. 59; Note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 605; (1928) 12
MINN. L. REV. 761.
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unworkable. There was common knowledge, and the gentlemen
of the inquest were genuinely representative. Quite a different
institution is the grand jury of American jurisdictions, elabo-
rated in the draft code of 1849 and ensuing state codes of crim-
inal procedure. Not only had the respective r6les of jurors and
witnesses in the modern sense become long since differentiated,
but, still more to the point, prosecution had become public. An
elaborate organization of prosecuting attorneys and police de-
partments has grown up around the grand juries.
Prominent in grand jury legislation are provisions contem-
plating the interdependence of these agencies 2 For expert aid
the juries are to depend on the organization of the prosecutors,
and through them on the resources of departments of police.
The district attorney thus stands as counsel and moving spirit
of the juries, appealing before them to examine witnesses and
in fact conduct the investigation. In some jurisdictions the
power to issue grand jury subpoenas is for convenience reposed
in him.3 In this light the jurors are relegated to the position
of lay referees, but referees clothed with the inquisitorial power
which the prosecutor does not legally possess. In the normal
situation a grand jury is thus designed and in fact operates as a
prosecutor's instrument-a highly effective instrument for con-
ducting an investigation e.; pcarte and in secret. It provides him
in addition with a shield, with moral support.
It follows that grand jury evaluation resting indiscriminately
on criteria of independent initiative involves misconception of
the design of our procedural scheme. To carry the burdens of
expert investigators and legal counsel, the juries are in no sense
equipped and scarcely encouraged. For the uncovering of clues
and the driving along of investigation, reliance is placed, under
our codes, on the prosecutors and police. Civic organizations
and private individuals also figure prominently in widespread
investigations. New York City, for example, has had its Park.-
hurst and its Citizens' Union, Chicago its Crime Commission and
"Secret Six."
3 2For example, BIcH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 17234-17236; MONT. REV.
CODE (Choate, 1921) § 11829; NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) § 1408; NEV. COLIP.
LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 10828; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) c. 78,
par. 228.
The practice under such a statute led the Colorado court to suppose that
the district attorney had been entitled to be present and examine all wit-
nesses regardless of the wishes of the jurors even at common law. People
ex rel. Dist. Atty. v. Dist. CL, 75 Colo. 412, 225 Pac. 829 (1924).
33 For example: KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 62, § 916; BlIcr. Co.,aP.
LAws (1929) § 17235; NEn. Comp. STAT. (1929) c. 29, par. 1409.
Some statutes provide that the grand jury may issue subpoenas.
MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, 1921) § 12179 (2) ; N. D. ComP. L ,1ws ANN. (1913)
§ 11025. TEX. REV. CODE CRIM. PROC. (Vernon, 1928) art. 382, confers the
power on the foreman.
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But the normal picture just sketched must not completely
obscure the potential independence of the jurors, on occasion as-
serted, particularly in exposures of local political corruption. To
recall an instance, exposure of the Minneapolis system of graft
under Mayor Ames' administration was forced through by the
foreman of a grand jury.34 There is nothing to prevent the
jurors, should they feel so inclined, from taking the reins in their
own hands and launching an investigation. Should the prose-
cutor prove un-cooperative or actually hostile, they may exclude
him from the room and proceed independently23 Should he
refuse to issue subpoenas or to draft desired bills of indictment,
the court may order him to do their bidding, or supplant him
with a special prosecuting attorney. 6
For purposes of investigating into a particular incident a
regular grand jury may be sufficiently equipped to proceed inde-
pendently. But where a general investigation Is contemplated,
considerable time is required. A regular grand jury in New
York City, for example, devotes to its work but five mornings
a week, of two hours each, for one month. And most of this
time is necessarily occupied with routine. But special grand
juries may be impanelled to conduct investigations, while the
regulars carry on with the ordinary work of passing on bills of
indictment, and may be continued over from month to month,
to carry on a lengthy investigation. 7 Thus one in Philadelphia
was continued over successively during a period of seven months,
while inquiring into the police department and local racketeer-
ing.- In New York City, both federal and state juries are
similarly from time to time continued over.
The lack of funds and expert assistance is, however, a serious
obstacle in the case of a grand jury proceeding independently in
a matter of considerable scope. Inquiry into complicated mat-
ters of public interest requires, moreover, considerable skill.
So it is that within their scope, the non-criminal agencies are
apt to be more effective .3  Particularly is this the case where a
whole system of organized corruption is to be exposed. The ap-
propriations for the Hofstadter Committee run into the hun-
34 2 LINCOLN STEFFENS, Autobiography (1931) 377-379.
3-Matter of the District Attorney's Relations to the Grand Jury, 14 N. Y.
Cr. 431 (1900). Contra: People ex rel. Dist. Att'y v. Dist. Ct., supra n6to 32.
36 For an instance where the attorney-general refused to proceed with a
case before the grand jury, thereby leading the court to appoint a special
prosecutor, consult N. Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1932, III, at 6.
37 See Special Grand Juries in Illinoiq (1931) 22 J. CRim. L. 163.
38 SPECIAL PRESENTMENTS OF THE GRAND JURY, AUG. SESSIONS, 1928,
COURT OF OYER AND TERmINER AND QUARTER SESSIONS OF TIE PEACE FOR
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILA.
39 Medalie, op. cit. supra note 13, at 7.
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dreds of thousands. It is served by a whole corps of assistant
counsel, accountants, and trained investigators. The same was
true of the investigation by the two Moreland Act Commis-
sioners into the Queens Sewer Scandal of the Connolly r~gime.
Such agencies are coming, more and more, to supplant grand
juries in this field.
Opportunity for Obstructive Tactics
Prominent among the criteria of inquisitorial efficiency is the
relative vulnerability of any particular agency to obstructive
tactics of various kinds. The various non-criminal investigating
agencies are, for example, particularly susceptible to jurisdic-
tional attacks. Exercising their powers by virtue of particular
statutes or resolutions, and within the limits of the respective
legislative, administrative, or executive purposes upon which
their validity depends, such bodies are constantly open to ques-
tions of constitutional scope and statutory construction.o Wit-
nesses may raise such objections, and, whether they be well
grounded or not, considerable time and expense are consumed
in bringing them to final test. The inquiry by the Hofstadter
Committee has already involved an extra session of the New
York legislature to patch up its statutory powers, and sundry
appeals by the obstreperous with attendant stays. The first
inquiry into the Queens Sewer Scandal by a Moreland Act Com-
missioner in New York was, after the expenditure of consider-
able time and money by the investigators, set at nought by a
successful jurisdictional attack. New legislation had to be pas-
40 People ex rel. Webster v. Van Tassel, 17 N. Y. Supp. 938 (Co. Ct. 1892)
(committee of common council) ; Matter of Superintendent of the Poor, 6
App. Div. 144, 39 N. Y. Supp. 878 (2d Dep't 1896) (committee of super-
visors); Matter of Nicosia, 180 App. Div. 427, 167 N. Y. Supp. 912, (1st
Dep't 1917) (com'r of agriculture); Matter of Mendel, 162 App. Div. 371,
147 N. Y. Supp. 603 (1st Dep't 1914) 0 af'd., 214 N. Y. 46, 103 N. E. 94
(1915) (transit commission); People v. American Ice Co., 120 App. Div.
234, 104 N. Y. Supp. 858 (1st Dep't 1907) (attorney-general under Anti-
Monopoly Act); Matter of Rice, 129 Misc. 693, 223 N. Y. Supp. 351 (Sup.
Ct. 1927) (attorney-general under Blue Sky law); Matter of Union Bank,
204 N. Y. 313, 97 N. E. 737 (1912) (superintendent of banks); Mitchell v.
Cropsey, 177 App. Div. 663, 164 N. Y. Supp. 336 (2d Dep't 1917) (Justice
under Greater N. Y. City Charter § 1534); Matter of Foster, 139 App. Div.
769, 124 N. Y. Supp. 667 (2d Dep't 1910) (commissioner of accounts); see
Matter of Hirshfield v. Craig, 239 N. Y. 98, 113, 145 N. E. 816, 820
(1924); People ex rel. Sabold v. Webb, 23 N. Y. St. Rep. 324, 5 N. Y.
Supp. 855, (Sup. Ct. 1889) (legislative committee); cf. Matter of Barnes,
204 N. Y. 108, 97 N. E. 508 (1912); cf., also, The Hague cases, 103 N. J.
Eq. 505, 143 Atl. 836 (1928); 104 N. J. Eq. 31, 144 Atl. 546 (1929); 104
N. J. Eq. 369, 145 Atl. 618 (1929) ; 105 N. J. Eq. 134, 147 Atl. 220 (1929);
9 N. J. Eq. 89, 150 Atl. 322 (1930).
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sed before the inquiry could go on, under conduct of a judge,
and in secret session. 41
A grand jury, however, encounters practically none of these
obstructions. Since it is charged with inquiry into all crimes
committed in the jurisdiction, questions as to the scope permitted
its inquiry do not tend to arise.' A witness need be apprised
of no "case" or "charge," 42 and the fruitlessness of quibbles as
to relevancy discourages objections on that ground.4 3 Nor is a
witness in other respects entitled to set limits to the investiga-
tion. As held in Blair v. United States,44 he may not contest the
validity of a statute creating the crime under inquiry, nor may
he challenge the authority and jurisdiction of the grand jury,
provided it has "a de facto existence and organization." There
are also practical difficulties in the way of raising objections. A
witness is unattended by counsel. The little that appears on the
face of a noncommittal subpoena is all that he is entitled to know
concerning the aims and purposes of the inquiry. Hearings are
secret, and -proceedings are presumed to be regular, with prac-
tically no avenue open to the recalcitrant one for securing in-
formation. This unquestioned breadth of inquisitorial scope
affords a calm and uninterrupted inquiry in striking'contrast
to the hurly-burly of a legislative investigation. 4 ,
Perjured and evasive testimony constitute still another form
of obstructive tactics, suggesting brief consideration of the sanc-
tions available against each. For the confinement of an inquiry,
in theory, to some limited subject matter or purpose, may re-
strict its progress indirectly by weakening the perjury sanction
on the score of materiality, as well as directly by narrowing the
field of the relevant concerning which answers may be compelled.
To such limitations the non-criminal agencies are peculiarly sub-
ject.46
41 See Matter of Connolly v. Scudder, 222 App. Div. 604, 605, 227 N. Y.
Supp. 47, (2d Dep't 1928); Matter of tichardson, 247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E.
655 (1928).
42 Matter of Black, 47 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370 (1906); Note (1906) 6 CoL. L. Rllv. 347;
Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538 (1911) ; see Matter of N11-
tional Window Glass Workers, 287 Fed. 219, 221-2 (N. D. Ohio, 1922).
4 3
'Ex parte Butt, 78 Ark. 262, 93 S. W. 992 (1906).
.44250 U. S. 273, 39 Sup. Ct. 468 (1919).
45 Given a suitable statute, an inquisitorial magistrate or prosecutor
should be similarly untrammelled.
46 People v. Hebberd, 96 Misc. 617, 162 N. Y. Supp. 80 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
In Commonwealth v. Ransdall, 153 Ky. 334, 155 S. W. 1117 (1913), an
attempt on the part of the state legislature to free a special investigative
agency from the limitations of the element of materiality involved in per-
jury is discussed. But in a later case, Mitchell v. Comm., 237 Ky. 849, 36
S. W. (2d) 649 (1931), the same court indicates that a requirement of
relevancy will still obtain.
[Vol. 41700
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The r6le of the "materiality" requirement in prosecutions for
perjury before a grand jury-or for that matter, before any
body with comparably broad scope of inquiry-is inevitably one
of extreme flexibility. Lacking even a definite charge to afford
points of reference, such an issue with reference to the objects
of a John Doe proceeding affords opportunity for considerable
judicial control of inquisitorial scope. 7  Since grand juries are
not impanelled for mere groundless snooping, a question whether
a witness knows of the commission of any crimes, may well be
considered immaterial by a court unable to find the "point in
question." 4 8 But beyond that, guiding notions as to the "matter
at issue," invoked to premise opinions leading one way or the
other, would seem to denote pretty much what one may choose.
Not infrequently a decision on materiality is accompanied by
no expressed standard. 9 In favor of untrammelled inquiry, the
opinion in Carroll v. United States stands preeminent:
"Its investigation and full duty is not performed unless and
until every clue has been run down -and all witnesses searched
for and examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been
committed, and to charge the proper person with the commission
thereof. Its investigation proceeds step by step. A false state-
ment by a witness in any of the steps, though not relevant in an
essential sense to the ultimate issues pending before the grand
jury, may be material, in that it tends to influence or impede the
course of the inveitigation." 50
Where the summary power of contempt is invoked against
falsehoods amounting to obvious obstructionism, no issues as to
materiality need necessarily arise.51 The gist of the contempt is
the insulting or frivolous quality of the objectionable answers.
The range of this summary method should not-loose decisions
to the contrary-comprehend each and every instance of false-
4 7 Amongst cases allowing a wide investigative range, consult State v.
Wakefield, 73 Mlo. 549 (1881); State v. Turley, 153 Ind. 345, 55 N. E. 30
(1899); State v. Ackerman, 214 Mlo. 325, 113 S. W. 1087; 22 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1192 (1908) ; People v. Howland, 63 Colo. 414, 167 Pac. 961 (1917) ;
State v. Ruddy, 287 Mlo. 52, 228 S. W. 760 (1921). For a narrower view,
see People v. Morrison, 98 Mlisc. 555, 164 N. Y. Supp. 712 (Gen. Sess. 1917);
Clayton v. U. S., 284 Fed. 537 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922).
48 State v. McCormick, 52 Ind. 169 (1875). But where a grand jury is
expressly allowed to call and question any witness as to whether he knows
of any crime, the perjury sanction is available. State v. Terry, 30 Mo. 368
(1860); Wofford v. State, 21 Ala. App. 521, 109 So. 886 (1926).
49 For example, Brzezinski v. U. S., 198 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912);
Lewis v. State, 78 Ark. 567, 94 S. W. 61a (1906); State v. Sweeten, 83 N.
J. L. 369, 85 Atl. 311 (1912).
50 16 F. (2d) 951, 953 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ; Note (1927) 40 HAnv. L. Ruv.
780.
51 See People v. Freeman, 256 Ill. App. 233 (1930).
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hood stirring inquisitorial impatience. Nor may it properly be
employed as a thumbscrew for third-degreeing a witness into
telling any story desired by the inquisitors.U2 Its proper func-
tion is simply to exert pressure on a witness blocking an inquiry,
by falsehoods patent, or evasions as to matters obviously within
his own knowledge. Resort to such tactics will justify com-
mitment of the recalcitrant one to jail until, in the words of
.Judge Learned Hand, "he may appear . . . and see whether
he can tell a story which is not so obviously a mere sham." 11
The development of this summary method for controlling the
contumacious is identified, however, almost exclusively with pro-
ceedings of trial courts. For its extension to grand jury pro-
ceedings, one must look to the southern district of the second
federal circuit in New York.54 No similar extension to proceed-
ings before non-criminal investigating bodies is noticeable, and
might well encounter considerable judicial reluctance. For they
may not, like the grand jury, be regarded as "arms of the
court," and the contempt power is charily granted.
Compelling Attendace and Testimony of Suspects
A feature of the John Doe form of inquisitorial proceedings-
unlike those following the lodging of specific charges of crime-
is the possibility of calling all persons with knowledge, whether
they be suspects or not. Were this not permissible, in general,
investigation would be seriously blocked. But suppose the ex-
treme case, where a person ultimately to be indicted is recognized
as such from the start. Were one to proceed before a magistrate
by complaint against such a person, he would then be entitled
to refuse to answer all questions. He there has his privilege,
just as on trial.55 But under the John Doe form of inquiry no
charge need be laid against him. As a matter of form he is not
yet a party, though in fact the proceeding may well be aimed
at him from the start. Construction of the privilege against
self-incrimination here bears directly on inquisitorial scope.
The treatment of this problem, in connection with grand jury
proceedings, exhibits a variety of attitudes, consonant with
the increasingly controversial character of the party's privilege
as a whole. Some courts refuse to look through the veil of the
John Doe form at all.55 Feeling is also expressed that the wit-
52 See Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt (1931) 31
CoL. L. Rsv. 956, 969.
-a U. S..v. Appel, 211 Fed. 495, 497 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1913).
54 Loubriel v. U. S., 9 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; U. S. v. Dachis,
36 F. (2d) 601 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); O'Connell v. U. S., 40 F. (2d) 201 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1930). -
55 4 W:rGMoRE, EVIDENC E (2d ed. 1923) § 2260.
5G U. S. v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156, (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1902) ; Pick v. Statc,
702 [Vol. 41
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ness' privilege of refusing to answer specific incriminating
questions should suffice.57 Many courts, on the other hand, pre-
fer a less forthright stand. A privilege against being called in
a proceeding "in fact aimed against one" is apt to be conceded
in principle, though often astutely avoided in the particular
case.53 For example, the objection was not raised correctly,5 or
the error was not prejudicial,c° or to reverse a conviction would
only mean the circuity of a proper re-indictment1 But the
privilege lurks in the background, available where abuse is
strongly felt.62
The same problem arises in proceedings before magistrates
with inquisitorial powers, as evidenced by an opinion by the
Attorney General of South Dakota in 1926, warning prosecutors
that the John. Doe form of complaint should not be used to cover
the calling of suspects against whom proceedings were aimed
from the start 3 The courts in that state took a similar view,
although pointing out that it was for the aggrieved one to prove
that a given proceeding was in fact aimed at him.P The oppos-
ing attitude, to the effect that a privilege against answering
specific questions is enough, is found in a decision by the Con-
necticut cour.
In proceedings before a non-criminal inquisitorial body, how-
ever, no similar objection to the calling of suspects obtains. A
proceeding by a Moreland Act Commissioner, such as that in-
volved in Matter of Phillips," may indeed be aimed quite directly
at a witness, but the purpose is non-penal-the removal of an
allegedly incompetent official. The question of privilege arises,
however, where the transcript of testimony is handed over to
the grand jury or, in an information state, to the committing
143 Md. 192, 121 AtI. 918 (1923); People v. Laudcr, S2 Mich. 109, 46 N. W.
956 (1890).
57 State v. Comer, 157 Ind. 611, 62 N. E. 452 (1902).
5 People v. Page, 116 Cal. 386, 48 Pac. 32G (1897); Radinshy v. People,
66 Colo. 179, 180 Pac. S8 (1919); Terr v. Torres, 10 N. .1. 615, 121 Pac.
27 (1911).
59 State v. Anderson, 10 Ore. 448 (1882).
60 State v. Donelon, 45 La. Ann. 745 (1893).
El See Lindsey v. State, 69 Ohio St. 215, 224, 69 N. E. 126, 129 (1903).
-, People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N. Y. Supp. 13 (lst Dep't
1908); People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356. 128 N. Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911);
State v. Froiseth, 16 Minn. 296 (1871).
c Op. AT'Tr' GEN. S. D. (1926) 146. See also Matter of Jobn-on, 27 S. D.
386, 131 N. W. 453 (1911) ; State v. Daniels, supra note 14.
c4State v. Smith, 228 N. W. 240 (S. D. 1929).
<5 See McCarthy v. Clancy, supra. note 14, at 490, 148 Atl. at 555.
' 143 App. Div. 522, 128 N. Y. Supp. 482 (2d Dep't 1911). In a pro-
ceeding looking to his removal fron the office of borough president, respond-
ent, then under indictment for offenses connected with the subject matter
of the present investigations, was subpoenaed. His application for an order
vacating the subpoena was unsuccessful on appeal.
1932]
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magistrate. In State v. Rixon" an indictment was quashed,
where the grand jury had had before it a transcript of testimony
given by the accused, in an investigation by the fire marshall,
wherein the (subsequently) accused had been subpoenaed.
Power to Take Action on the Findings
Since the object of successful investigation is to induce action of
one kind or another, the possibilities open to any given body are
of considerable concern. If the prime objective is an exposure
of corrupt conditions, for example, the body conducting the pro-
ceeding should be in a position to achieve publicity. Where it is
to bring about prosecutions, a fairly direct connection between
the investigators and formal criminal accusing agencies is de-
sirable.
For the purpose of initiating prosecution, a grand jury is, of
course, in the most favorable position possible. But one question
arises: Is it to be permitted to indict at once, or only after bind-
over by a committing magistrate? The New York Code Com-
missioners, in 1849, strongly opposed the current practice of
permitting indictment without preliminary bindover, feeling that
so unrestricted a power of accusation was fraught with danger,
in the form of indictments based on little or no evidence, and on
charges which the accused might well have explained away if
afforded an opportunity to do so before a committing magis-
trate.0 8 It was further urged in favor of the compulsory pre-
liminary examination: "A responsible accuser is presented, to
whom he may look for redress, if the accusation be malicious or
unfounded; but when he is accused by the grand jury, this pro-
tection is denied him, and he is dragged before the bar of justice,
to answer a charge possibly as false in its substance, as it may
be malicious in the motive by which it is prompted." I'l But this
restriction has not generally found its way into the codes and
practice of our jurisdictions. Here and there a statute requires
the preliminary examination, but in the same jurisdictions al-
ternative modes of proceeding without such examination exist.10
Hence, while always permissible and quite usual, proceeding by
way of bindover is not essential.
A magistrate conducting a John Doe inquiry is likewise in a
position to take direct action, in the form of binding the accused
over for action by the grand jury or prosecutor. The non-
67 180 Minn. 573, 231 N. W. 217, 68 A. L. R. 1501 (1930); (1930) 15
MINN. L. REv. 344; of. State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24, 139 N. W. 514 (1913),
Ann. Cas. 1914C., 418.
s FOURTH REPORT, s3upr note 29, at x~xvii.
69 Ibid. xxxviii.
70 The situations in Georgia, Pennsylvania and Tennessee will be con-
sidered in detail in other articles.
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criminal investigating bodies are not, however, so happily situ-
ated, as suggested by the recent complaint of counsel for the
Hofstadter legislative committee in New York: "All we can do
here is adduce the facts. If the other agencies that are charged
with the duties of enforcement will not act, how can we act?" 71
A solution for this predicament, where feasible, has been the
type of dual appointment already referred to in another con-
nection. Samuel Untermyer, for example, while counsel for the
Lockwood Housing Investigating Committee of the legislature in
New York, had himself appointed Special Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral and also Special Deputy District Attorney. As such he
secured hundreds of indictments.72  Even though this be done,
however, it is still necessary for a grand jury to rehear the evi-
dence in a state where prosecution by indictment has not been
abolished 3
Where the primary objective is exposure of a general condi-
tion or official misconduct not quite amounting to crime, a grand
jury is in a less favorable position. Grand jury proceedings are
required to be secret, and disclosure of testimony there given is,
in general, forbidden. From time to time, in consequence, a jury
makes a "report." These documents may contain only comments
on the state of the region, or impersonal broadsides against a
condition, interesting chiefly as news. But when they attack
an official or group, redress is apt to be sought. For while on
public record, and thence into the newspapers, unlike indict-
ments they cannot be met. Although unexpunged, they call for
no trial. Will the court receive them? Has the subject ag-
grieved any remedy, either against the jurors reporting or a
newspaper reprinting the report?
At the outset these reports must be distinguished from the
presentments with which they have so often been confused, and
in the legitimacy of which they have consequently tended to
share. Presentments in strict sense are, just as indictments,
specific charges of crime designating persons accused, but taken
in first instance by a grand jury. They may be regarded simply
as instructions for indictments, for the framing of the latter
normally follows.7 4 However, since public prosecutors are, under
71 N. Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 12, 1931, at '8.
12 N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1931, I, at 19.
73 See Tuttle, The Grand Jury System; Shoudd It Be Abolishcd or
Strengthened? (1927) 5 THE PANEL 2, 3: "It should be possible for the
judge or magistrate conducting such a public inquiry [referring to so-
called John Doe proceedings] to do so in the presence of the grand jury
sitting in open court. At the close of the inquiry, the court would instruct
the grand jurors as to whether the evidence was in law sufficient to warrant
the consideration as a basis for an indictment; and the grand jurors would
then retire to consider their action."
- A definition of "presentment" is embodied in § 270 of the draft code
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our practice, available to the grand jury for the drawing up of
bills of indictment, the presentment form is practically ob-
solete. Reports, on the other hand, are neither susceptible nor
intended to serve as bases for indictments. The varying recep-
tions accorded reports suggest their separate consideration in
two groups: first, those addressing themselves to a general con-
dition; and second, those censuring particular persons.
To this day it is not uncommon for a grand jury, usually
at the close of its term, to make a report concerning some con-
dition in the county. In the seventeenth century these reports
were apparently taken more seriously than at the present time.
Considered the official exponent of county opinion, "the 'Gentle-
men of the Grand Jury' usually figured first" in petitions to
Parliament, "whilst in their frequent presentments at the As-
sizes and Quarter Sessions they were perpetually drawing atten-
tion to grievances." 7 Then, as now, reports occasionally stirred
up official irritation. American grand juries carried on the
tradition. In colonial Virginia, for example:
"It appears to have been a common practice for grand juries
gathered at the capital to express their opinions on things in
general, and on the administration of the royal governor in par-
ticular. It was an advantage, therefore, for the Governor to
have a group chosen who could be counted on to pass a laudatory
resolution which he could modestly forward to the Board of
Trade as an indication of public opinion. Taking matters into
his own hands, Governor Nicholson (1698-1705) sent outside
the capital for a foreman, and gave orders to the sheriff as
to choosing or excluding other persons." "
In maling these reports the jurors were understood to act not
as the representatives, but rather as a respectable collection of
the people of the county. It was a practice founded on no law.
In the words of an early Pennsylvania judge: "This authority
is founded only on use and a presumed public convenience, and,
when exercised discreetly, it may be attended with good
effects." 7
But the prestige of grand jurors as formulators of county
opinion was already on the wane during the eighteenth century,
of the New York Commissioners, supra note 29. Consult also 1 CIIITTY'S
CRIM INAL LAW (1819) 110. In a few jurisdictions, by statute, "present-
ments" have taken on new meanings and aspects, particularly in Georgia,
Louisiana, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.
75 SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM TIE
REVOLUTION TO THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT: THE PAIIr AND TIIIi
COUNTY (1906) 455.
7, ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAw IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1930) 70.
77 Observations' on the Duty of a Grand Jury (1793), Addison's Reports
(Pa. 2d ed. 1883) 70, 73.
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their reports exhibiting a diminishing frequency and gradual
loss of reality. "By the end of the century they had come to
be little more than sonorous generalities, loyal addresses, and
declarations on national politics, usually 'high Tory' in char-
acter." 78 When Edward Livingston drew up his Codes for
Louisiana in the early nineteenth century, he felt the practice
of making these reports to be unhappy, announcing in his In-
troductory Report that "so far as positive interdiction can go,
this entrance to party spirit through the chamber of the grand
jury has been closed." '9 The New York Commissioners made
no specific reference to the subject, either in their Code or Intro-
duction, but the implications of both are in accord with Living-
ston's views.,( With the exception of the Louisiana Code, how-
ever, express statutory prohibitions of reports are lacking. Re-
ports of the old type continue to appear, are generally received
without question, and may sometimes serve a useful purpose.
Reports censuring particular individuals raise new considera-
tions. Granting that criticism of a public official-for such
reports are usually directed at a local official-raises questions
of public, or political, interest just as truly as a report concern-
ing a condition, it is questionable whether grand juries may
'wisely be permitted this opportunity. Partaking in the public
eye, as such reports well might, of the sanction and authority
associated with grand jury accusation in the form of indictment,
they would carry a quite disproportionate weight. With the
decreasingly representative character of grand juries and the
increase of other organs for expression of censure of office-
holders, the public interest factor has been felt to dwindle as
against considerations leading to suppression of the reports.
First amongst the remedies available to aggrieved subjects
of such reports are motions to expunge from the records. The
development may be sketched from Matter of Gardiner 81 arising
out of an appearance before the grand jury in 1909 by that
ardent reformer, the Rev. Charles I. Parkhurst, who urged
them to make a "presentment" in regard to the general condi-
tion of the police force. The result was a report against the
district attorney, charging him, so he claimed, "by imputation,
with the commission of a crime, which it fails to specify," and
he moved that it be stricken out. The court felt that "the grand
jury should never, under cover of a presentment, present an in-
7S SDNEy AND BEATRICE WEB, op. cit. ;*tpra note 75, at 456.
79 1 LIVINGSTON, CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE (1873) 372.
O Consider, for example, their insistence on a preliminary examination,
and their general policy of curbing the arbitrariness of grand jury accusa-
tion, discussed supra,
sl 31 Mlise. 364, 64 N. Y. Supp. 760 (Gen. Sess. 1900). For a general
note on the power to make reports, see (1923) 22 A. L. R. 1350, 1367.
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dividual in this manner" and accordingly ordered the report
"set aside."
In 1905, however, in Matter of Jones,8 the county court re-
fused to set aside a report censuring the board of supervisors,
and was affirmed by the Appellate Division. Judge Jenks, writing
the majority opinion, pointed to section 260 of the Code, charg-
ing grand juries to inquire into the condition and management
of public prisons in the county, and the wilful and corrupt mis-
conduct in office of public officials. Suggesting that these powers
were conferred for some purpose, he concluded that reports
were not always unwarranted. If rendered upon the exercise
of these inquisitorial powers, though incidentally censuring this
or that official, they need not be stricken out. He suggested,
however, by way of dictum, that "if under the guise of a pre-
sentment, the grand jury simply accuse, thereby compelling the
accused to stand mute, where the presentment would warrant
indictment so that the accused might answer, the presentment
may be expunged." An appeal from this order was dismissed,
the Court of Appeals finding neither "an inherent right of ap-
peal" nor statutory authority on which it might base jurisdiction,
and adding: "Such a motion does not involve a legal right of an
individual, but the right of the court itself to keep its own
records free from matters of an immaterial or improper char-
acter." 8
More influential than the majority opinion of the Appellate
Division in Matter of Jones, was the dissenting opinion of Judge
Woodward." His view of the Code empowered grand juries only
to indict or not indict; so-called "presentments" against in-
dividuals, affording no opportunity to be heard and defend, were
not to be tolerated. What of the argument of Judge Jenks, that
from section 260 may be inferred a power to make reports or
so-called presentments? The statute is silent as to what grand
juries shall do after making the investigations there required.
As to condition and management of the public prisons, one might
infer from this an authori r to make general reports; but corrupt
misconduct in office is always indictable, and in that instance
at least, failing indictment, reports have no place." Lower New
York courts have refused to follow the Jones case majority, in
each instance granting the desired motion to expunge., In the
82 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't 1905).
83 Matter of Jones, 181 N. Y. 389, 74 N. E. 226 (1905).
S4 Supra note 82, at 59, 92 N. Y. Supp. at 277.
85 Medalie, op. cit. supra note 13. For similar construction of similar
statutes, see Matter of Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore City, inf1ra note
88; Parsons v. Age Herald Pub. Co., infra note 96, at 446, 61 So. at 3492
Rector v. Smith, infra note 95, at 306.
86 Matter of Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
For comment on this case, see Medalie, op. cit. supra note 13, at 0. See also
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latest of these, Judge Heffernan found presentments abolished,
for "unless the Court comes to his [the applicant's] aid, he is
left without any remedy, except an appeal to the court of Mrs.
Grundy."97
This attitude has been reflected in recent appellate decisions
of Maryland - and Wisconsin," where refusals to expunge reports
attacking public officials were reversed on appeal. The issue
is viewed as one of power, truth or falsity being immaterial.
With respect to a statute similar to section 260 in New York,
and providing that the jury "shall make presentments of all
offenses and omissions of any person in or relating to said in-
stitution" (the jail), the Maryland court indicated that reports
would be proper "so long as they do not point out individuals
as subjects of public criticism and opprobrium."
In the foregoing cases appeals were entertained, but suppose,
as occurred in Matter of Jones, jurisdiction to review is denied.
Mandamus also may fail, as in Missouri 00 and Nevada,"1 refusal
to expunge being considered no mere ministerial act. In Michi-
gan, however, mandamus will issue without concern as to dis-
tinctions between "ministerial" and "judicial," nor as to whether
there be other adequate modes of redress.2 The reports are un-
authorized and reprehensible. That, in Michigan, appears to
be enough.
A suit for libel may also be based on one of these reports,
as in Bennett v. Stockwell- 3 which involved the very report
ordered expunged in one of the Michigan cases. To a plea of
qualified privilege the court replied that, had any privilege at-
tached, it would not have ordered the report expunged. Any
showing of good faith and the like was relegated to the end of
:Matter of Funston, 133 Misc. 620, 233 N. Y. Supp. 81 (Sup. Ct. 1929);
Matter of Crosby, 126 Misc. 250, 213 N. Y. Supp. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1925);
Matter of Woodbury, 155 N. Y. Supp. 851 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Matter of Os-
bdrne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1910) ; Matter of Hef-
fernan, 125 N. Y. Supp. 737 (County Ct. 1909).
87Matter of Funston, supra note 86, at 623, 233 N. Y. Supp. at 82.
81 Matter of Report of Grand Jury of Baltimore City, 152 Md. 616, 137
Atl. 370 (1927).
s9 Matter of Grand Jury Report, 235 N. 'W. 789 (Wis. 1931).
9) State ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdeman, 187 S. W. 257 (Mo. 1910).
91 State ex rel. Weber v. McFadden, 46 Nev. 1, 205 Pac. 594 (1922).912 Oakman v. Recorder of City of Detroit, 207 Mich. 15, 173 N. W. 34G
(1919) (report by a "one man grand jury"); Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit
Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150 N. W. 141 (1914), Ann. Cas. 1916E 223.
In HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REmmmuIs (3d ed. 1896) 196, the author com-
ments on the exceptional scope given to the writ of mandamus in the
jurisdiction of Michigan. See also State ex rel. Weber v. McFadden, supra
note 91, at 7, 205 Pac. at 595.
9 197 Mich. 50, 163 N. W. 482 (1917), L. R. A. 1917F 761, Ann. Cas.
1918E, 1196; (1918) 2 MINN. L. R-V. 154.
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mitigating damages. Courts of other jurisdictions, however,
while concurring as to the lack of power to make such reports
in the first place, feel impelled to recognize a qualified privilege.09
Where the action is against a newspaper republishing the re-
port, the press is usually said to stand in the shoes of the jurors,
and the few cases on the subject accord a qualified privilege.9"
In Michigan, however, where the jurors enjoy no privilege what-
soever, it may be supposed that the press would be similarly de-
fenceless. The qualified privilege view is most clearly expressed
in the Alabama case of Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., where
the report censured a constable but expressly fell short of find-
ing grounds for impeachment. While declaring the report un-
authorized, the court nevertheless took heed of the immemorial
practice of making such reports, and suggested that these reports
were within the spirit if not the letter of the privilege of fair
comment in judicial proceedings, understood with the following
reservations: ". .. (1) That libelous imputations in a grand
jury's report upon private citizens, or upon public officers, not
touching their fitness for office or their fidelity to the public
service, or the propriety of their official acts, are not properly
matters of public interest; (2) that the privilege does not attach
at all until the report has been duly published by the grand jury
itself in open court; and (3) that matters, the publication of
which is forbidden by law, or by the order of the court as being
improper for publication, are not to be regarded as privileged
with respect to their publication by third persons." 01
Such is the reception accorded grand jury reports. Taken in
94 On the issue of good faith or malice it may be important to show how
particular jurors acted in their deliberations, with reference to the report.
The trial court in Bennett v. Stockwell ruled that a statute [MI.H. CoMI,.
LAWS (1897) § 11887J precluded the admission of. testimony by grand
jurors as to proceedings in the grand jury room respecting the voting for,
composition and publication of the alleged libel. On appeal, howev(er, it
was held that the statute was not applicable to questions not properly
before the grand jury, i.e., reports of this character, and that consequently
the testimony would be receivable.
95 Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa 302 (1860); Rich v. Eason, 180 S. W. 303
(Tex. Civ. App. 1915); (1916) 64 U. PA. L. REV. 391; (1910) 16 COL.
L. REV. 163.
In Coons v. State, 194 Ind. 580, 134 N. E. 194, 20 A. L. R. 908 (1922),
a report upbraiding the presiding judge was treated as a direct contempt.
The case is noted with approval in (1922) 70 U. PA. L. REV. 331.
w Ferguson v. Houston Press, 1 S. W. (2d) 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927);
Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913). In
Poston v. Washington, Alexandria & Mt. Vernon R. R. Co., 36 D. C. App.
359, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 785 (1911), the court held, in reversing an order
sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, that the report was not privileged
as part of a judicial proceeding. Whether it would deny even a conditional
privilege is not entirely clear.
07 Supra note 96, at 448, 61 So. at 349.
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connection with the requirement that all proceedings by a grand
jury be conducted in secret, and the prohibitions against any
disclosure of what takes place in the grand jury room, it becomes
clear that grand jury investigation is totally unsuited to situa-
tions calling for public exposure of whole systems of corruption
more urgently than the prosecution of particular individuals.
The non-criminal investigating agencies are not similarly ham-
pered. A legislative committee, like the Hofstadter for example,
may conduct public hearings. No requirement of secrecy is im-
posed, there is the privilege for fair comment, and full scope for
the publicizing of findings and charges is consequently afforded.
III
From the foregoing review of investigating agencies with con-
trasting adaptabilities, it is clear that no single uniform scheme,
for allocating inquisitorial powers and responsibilities exists.
In some jurisdictions grand juries are largely supplemented by
specialized agencies for purposes of widespread inquiry into
official misconduct, while in others the juries are primarily relied
on. In some the juries have been supplanted for ordinary in-
vestigation into crime by magistrates and prosecutors of the
"one man grand jury" type.
In other respects grand juries differ widely as one passes
from rural to urban counties, from state to state, and from the
states to the federal jurisdiction. With the pressure of business
in New York City, where three or more juries are constantly
in session in each county, one may contrast the situation in the
upstate counties, where but two or three a year are impanelled.
The very calibre of the juries themselves varies with differing
modes of selection, and the institution of Grand Jurors' Asso-
ciations,98 as in New York and a few other regions, alters the
picture considerably for the better in this regard. The type of
business handled by federal grand juries differs widely from
that entrusted to those of the states. The former are concerned
for the most part with crimes that may be considered at leisure;
their field is broader than that of the state juries which are con-
cerned in the main with suppressing violence.
Grand juries are differentiated on still another plane by varia-
tions in the local systems of which they are integral parts. The
need for and activities of a grand jury may take on one aspect
98 These voluntary associations date from 1913, when the first was
founded in New York County. Since then others have been organized for
five other New York counties, two New Jersey Counties, Baltimore, Illinois,
and the Southern and Eastern Federal Districts of New York. As tv the
activities of these associations, see THE PANEL and THE FmDrA Juio,
periodical publications of the New York County and Southern Federal Dis-
trict of New York associations.
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where magistrates' courts are centralized, °1 and where prosecu-
tors are of a relatively high grade, on full time and adequately
equipped; but quite another where the magistrates are scattered
justices of the peace, and where the prosecutors are on part time
and without assistance. For a grand jury does not function in
a vacuum. As an integral part of a system, a given jury will
exert influence and be influenced in a manner largely dependent
on the state of other agencies in the local process. Conclusions
here in terms of "the grand jury" are accordingly out of the
question. They could have no reference but to some imaginary
institution, fashioned from the data of diverse localities, by an
indiscriminate use of average and median. The issues controlling
a choice between grand juries and inquisitorial magistrates or
prosecutors-i.e. whether a jury affords moral support or a de-
moralizing dissipation of responsibility, whether the merely
'occasional character of friction between jury and prosecutor
indicates rubber-stamping or cooperation, and whether a jury
constitutes an effective non-political agency for keeping tabs on
the conduct of public officials or rather on irrelevancy injected
into the process, too inexperienced and out of touch to exert an
influence sufficient to justify their maintenance-can, therefore,
be determined only with refeience to a particular jurisdiction.
Little improvement in quality of process is to be anticipated
from mere substitutions of other agencies for grand juries.
Critics and crime surveys find shortcomings on the part of pros-
ecutors and magistrates quite comparable to those attributed to
the juries.00 In those jurisdictions where grand jury investiga.
tion has already fallen into complete disuse, attention may profit-
ably center on the quality of the magistrates and prosecutors
relied upon. But in the federal jurisdictions and in the many
states where grand juries are firmly entrenched, little prospect
and no compelling reasons for their elimination appear. The
problem in these quarters is to raise the standard of grand
jury investigation along the lines being marked out by the Grand
Jurors' Associations.
19 Harley, Detroit's New Model Criminal Court (1920) 11 J. CIuM. L.
398; REPORT OF THE EFFICIENCY COMMITTEE OF KENTUCKY ON THn
JUDMCLARY OF KENTUCKY (1923); Corrigan, Centralization Of Maqistrates
Courts In Manhattan (1928) 6 THE PANEL 1.
lOOAs to the magistrates' courts consult: MISSOURI CRIME SuRVEY (1920)
128, 156; ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (1929) 305-308; MoLEr, OUR CRIMINAL
COURTS (1930) c. 2; REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Or TH NATIONAL
COIMIISSION FOR LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (1931) 11 Ot seo,
As to prosecutors consult MISSOURI CI;IME SURVEY, 131-157; ILLINOIS
CRIE SURVEY, 278-9; MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
(1929) 74; REPORT ON PROSECUTION, stpra note 1, at 14.
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